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“They” are Less Human than “We”
are: Modern Prejudice in Human
Terms
Jeroen Vaes
Introduction
When Caribs were asked whence they came, they
answered, "We alone are people." The meaning of
the name Kiowa is "real or principal people." The
Lapps call themselves "men," or "human beings."
(...) The Tunguses call themselves "men." As a rule
it is found that nature peoples call themselves
"men." Others are something else - perhaps not
defined - but not real men. In myths the origin of
their own tribe is that of the real human race.
They do not account for the others. (Sumner, 1906,
p. 14)
1 Sumner's  (1906)  sociologically  inspired  work  "Folkways"  is  regarded  as  one  of  the
foundations  of  later  developed  social  psychological  theories  on  intergroup  relations
(Brewer  & Brown,  1998;  Brown,  2000).  Sumner  (1906)  was  the  first  to  use  the  term
ethnocentrism that he defined as “…this view of things in which one's own group is the
center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” (Sumner,
1906,  p. 13).  The  above  citation  contains  some  examples  that  illustrate  his
conceptualization of ethnocentrism. All involve the designation of one's own group as
human and imply the infra-humanization of “others.” Even though Sumner's work is
widely cited and ethnocentrism remains at the center of social psychological theorizing,
infra-humanization has been largely disregarded in explaining prejudice and intergroup
discrimination.  Only  theories  that  attempt  to  explain  extreme  behaviors  such  as
genocides, intergroup aggression, and exploitation have proposed related concepts such
as delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989), moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989), and a
lesser perceived humanity (Struch & Schwartz, 1989).
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2 The recent theoretical and empirical work of Leyens and his colleagues (2000, 2001, 2003)
revived the concept of infra-humanization and applied it to more subtle forms of bias.
Their basic premise states that people tend to reserve human nature for their own group,
in that they ascribe less uniquely human features to the outgroup. More specifically,
Leyens and his colleagues focused on uniquely human emotions. When asked to describe
their own group and a relevant outgroup in terms of different emotions, individuals were
reluctant to ascribe uniquely human emotions to the outgroup.
3 The present article aims at summarizing the theoretical framework and the main findings
of  the  recent  infra-humanization research in  intergroup relations.  In  addition,  some
preliminary data extending the infra-humanization theory will be presented that explore
the human content of intergroup stereotypes.
Infra-humanization: Theory and main findings
4 In the last decades, racism and discrimination have not only been acknowledged in their
obvious  blatant,  but  also  in  their  more  subtle,  forms  (Dovidio  &  Gaertner,  1998;
McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Whereas the overt forms of racism tend
to decline (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996), the more subtle forms of bias
are prevalent and give rise to some of  the ever-existing inequalities.  In Belgium, for
example, the Flemish Employment Service (i.e.,  VDAB) recently conducted a study on
their  own  job  web-sites  that  provide  employers  with  information  on  potential  job
candidates.  The  results  revealed  that  employees  with  foreign  sounding  names,  even
though they had equal qualifications,  had 15 % less chance to be selected for further
information than their more Belgian sounding counterparts. It goes without saying that
these kinds of subtle biases can have a large impact in everyday life and continue to
handicap an important part of our population.
5 A great deal of the work in social psychology tries to understand the nature and the
sources of intergroup discrimination. Many of these theories (for a review, see Brewer &
Brown, 1998), however, have reduced the bases of prejudice and discrimination to their
evaluative nature.  Discrimination can then arise  from either  the attribution of  more
positive traits, resources, facilities, help, etc. to the ingroup (i.e., ingroup favoritism) or
from the tendency to ascribe more negative properties to the outgroup (i.e., outgroup
derogation). In both cases, it does not really matter what these properties are; only the
fact that they create differential responses and that all reflect negative evaluations is
theoretically relevant. A recent extension of the traditional evaluative way of thinking
comes  from Leyens  and his  colleagues  (2000,  2001,  2003).  Combining the  theories  of
ingroup  favoritism  (for  a  recent  review,  see  Brewer  &  Brown,  1998)  and  subjective
essentialism (Haslam, Rotschild, & Ernst, 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), Leyens et al.
formulated the following reasoning:  If people think that their group is superior to other
groups, and attribute different essences to the ingroup and outgroups, then it follows
that people should ascribe a better essence to their own group. As a consequence, on a
dimension as fundamental as humanity, people believe that “the” human essence belongs
to their ingroup and that an infra-human essence characterizes (some) outgroups.
6 The three most cited characteristics that constitute the human essence were: intelligence
(reasoning,  thinking,  etc.),  uniquely  human emotions,  and language (communication)
(Leyens et al., 2000). Leyens and his colleagues concentrated on the emotional side of the
human essence, because there is already ample research demonstrating that individuals
discriminate against outgroups on the basis of  intelligence (Crocker,  Major,  & Steele,
1998) and language (Giles & Coupland, 1991). The human essence in terms of emotions
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was operationalized through people’s lay conception of what they see as uniquely human
emotions and emotions that they share with animals. Recent cross-cultural studies, using
French-speaking,  Spanish-speaking,  Dutch-speaking  and  American  English-speaking
participants  (Demoulin,  Leyens,  Paladino,  Rodriguez,  Rodriguez,  &  Dovidio,  2004),
revealed that all samples similarly differentiated between “uniquely human” and “non-
uniquely human” emotions.  Moreover,  similar dimensions to those mentioned by the
emotion literature (Ekman, 1992; Kemper, 1991) as differentiating between primary and
secondary emotions, were diagnostic for the difference between “non-uniquely human”
emotions  and  “uniquely  human”  emotions.  Therefore,  the  terms  primary  versus
secondary emotions were used to refer  to  respectively non-uniquely versus uniquely
human emotions. It is important to note, however, that the scientific view of emotions
makes  a  clear,  dichotomous distinction between a  few primary and many secondary
emotions, whereas the lay conception envisions emotions on a continuum going from
numerous “uniquely human” (e.g.,  shame, resentment, love, hope, disappointment) to
many  “non-uniquely  human”  emotions  (e.g.,  anger,  pain,  pleasure,  surprise,  fear,
excitement).
7 If  all  uniquely  human  characteristics  (i.e.,  intelligence,  language,  and  secondary
emotions) are necessary to be considered a human being, but none of them is sufficient, it
suffices to differentiate others from ourselves to our own group’s advantage on the basis
of  one  or  all  of  the  uniquely  human  characteristics  in  order  to  infra-humanize  the
outgroup.  Since  Leyens  et  al.  (2000,  2001,  2003)  chose  to  focus  on  emotions,  infra-
humanization  in  their  terms  implies  that  people  have  the  tendency  to  associate  or
attribute secondary emotions more easily to their ingroup than to an outgroup.
8 To date, several studies have addressed this general hypothesis (for a recent review see,
Demoulin,  Rodriguez,  Rodriguez,  Vaes,  Paladino,  Gaunt,  Cortes,  &  Leyens,  2004)  by
focusing on the attribution of secondary emotions. Indeed, if people have a tendency to
infra-humanize the outgroup, they should attribute more secondary emotions to their
ingroup than to an outgroup. Primary emotions, on the other hand, are shared by all
living species and should as such be allocated in a similar way to ingroups and outgroups.
To test this idea, Leyens et al. (2001, Studies 1 and 2) presented participants with a list of
characteristics that comprised, among some words related to competence and sociability,
positive (Study 1) or positive and negative (Study 2) secondary and primary emotions.
Participants  had  to  choose  the  characteristics  that  they  considered  typical  for  their
ingroup or typical of an outgroup. In these studies, a full design was obtained, in that
participants came either from the Canary Islands (low status group) or from mainland
Spain (high status group). Both experiments confirmed the hypothesis that participants
selected more secondary emotions for their ingroup than for the outgroup, independent
of the valence of the emotions or the status of the groups. These results highlight the bi-
directional  view of  the  present  theory.  Unlike  many  other  theories  that  attempt  to
explain racism or discrimination only from the dominant groups' point of view, Leyens et
al.'s (2000, 2001, 2003) emotional conception allows to observe the interaction of both
agent and victim and shows that racism is not limited to dominant groups.
9 Following the reasoning that the human essence tends to be reserved for the ingroup and
even  denied  to  the  outgroup,  it  is  conceivable  that  people  will  react  differently  to
outgroup  than  to  ingroup  members  who  express  themselves  in  terms  of  secondary
emotions. This hypothesis was confirmed by the work of Vaes and colleagues (2003, 2004).
In one of their experiments, Vaes et al. (2003, Study 1) used the lost e-mail technique
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(Castelli, Zogmaister, & Arcuri, 2001; Stern & Faber, 1997; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002)
to  look at  the  different  prosocial  behaviors  engendered by  secondary  emotions  in  a
helping situation. This paradigm consists of sending manipulated messages to different e-
mail accounts. Even though the message is addressed personally to each participant, it is
clearly an erroneous e-mail that was destined for somebody else. Using this method, Vaes
et al. manipulated the messages so that they started with either a primary or a secondary
emotion and were allegedly sent by either an ingroup or an outgroup member. Content
analysis on participants’ returns revealed that secondary emotions induced nicer replies
towards an ingroup compared to an outgroup member. Primary emotions did not induce
differential responses. This general pattern of results was replicated in another set of
studies  using  different  behavioral  measures.  When  the  target  expressed  secondary
emotions,  conformity was more likely towards a target that belonged to the ingroup
compared to the outgroup (Vaes et al., 2003, Studies 2 and 3); participants reported more
similarities  with  the  ingroup  compared  to  the  outgroup  target  (Study  3);  showed  a
general  tendency  to  approach  or  avoid  ingroup and  outgroup members  respectively
(Study  4);  and  the  perspective  of  an  ingroup  rather  than  an  outgroup  conversation
partner was accepted more easily (Vaes et al.,  2004). On the other hand, as expected,
primary emotions, not being a uniquely human characteristic did not result in a better
treatment for ingroup, compared to outgroup members.
The human content of intergroup stereotypes
10 These results show the pervasiveness of the infra-humanization bias, which is subtle, but
has clear, negative consequences for the outgroup. Until now, research only looked at
secondary emotions as the uniquely human characteristic that was attributed differently
to  the  ingroup  and  the  outgroup;  however,  other  characteristics  are  conceivable.
Stereotypes are probably the most studied characteristics in intergroup relations (Fiske,
1998). They are used to explain differences between groups (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001), and,
according to recent theorizing (Alexander, Brewer, & Hermann, 1999; Fiske et al., 2002),
their  content  reflects  the  socio-structural  relation  between  the  groups  at  hand.
Specifically, Fiske and her colleagues (2002) showed that relative status dictates the level
of competence conferred on a group, and type of interdependence (i.e., cooperative or
competitive) dictates the level of perceived warmth. Depending on a group’s perceived
position along these two structural dimensions, it may be stereotyped as both competent
and warm (mostly the ingroup or a reference group), competent but not warm (high
status, high conflict groups), incompetent but warm (low status, low conflict groups), or
neither  competent  nor  warm  (low  status,  high  conflict  groups).  Taking  the  socio-
structural model of Fiske et al. as a starting point, a recent study explored the human
content of stereotypes and aimed to show that the infra-humanization of the outgroup
can manifest itself through stereotypes.
11 As shown above, previous research has shown that infra-humanization appears largely
independent of different socio-structural  variables that define the intergroup context
(Leyens et al.,  2003). More specifically, Leyens et al.  (2001) have shown that both low
(Canarians) and high status groups (mainland Spanish people) are infra-humanized to the
same extent. Similarly, manipulating negative interdependence in terms of conflict or
competition has shown to increase the infra-humanization bias, but it is not a necessary
variable to observe it (Paladino, Vaes, & Leyens, 2001). Following previous research, we
expected  that  outgroup  stereotypes  would  be  seen  as  less  human  than  ingroup
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stereotypes regardless of the socio-structural relation that exists between the ingroup
and the outgroup.
12 A single study tested this general hypothesis in an Italian context. Given that previous
work on the content of stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002) demonstrated that the perceived
status and competition between groups determine the content of their stereotypes, the
present study incorporated three different intergroup situations that differed on these
dimensions based on pre-test judgments. Gypsies, compared to Italians, were seen as both
incompetent and not warm; Southern Italians in comparison to Northern Italians were
defined  as  warm  but  incompetent;  and  Americans  in  comparison  to  Italians  were
perceived as competent but not warm. Participants were assigned to one of these three
intergroup contexts and asked to judge a series of traits that were generated by naïve
pretest participants. Each trait was judged on its typicality to describe the ingroup, on its
typicality to describe the outgroup, on its human value, and on its valence. For each
participant, two within-subjects correlations partialing out valence were calculated, one
between the ingroup typicality and humanity ratings of all traits and the other between
the outgroup typicality and humanity ratings of all traits. In all three conditions, this
correlation for the ingroup was positive and significantly greater than zero, indicating
that the more a trait was seen as stereotypic in describing the ingroup the more it was
seen as human. Moreover, this correlation for the ingroup was greater than that for the
outgroup, showing that ingroup stereotypes are generally seen as more human than the
outgroup stereotypes. As expected, this difference occurred independently of the socio-
structural relationship between the groups.
13 The present results indicate that the infra-humanization effect may be generalized to
stereotypes. In order to be conclusive, however, more research is needed that includes
more groups and different intergroup situations. In addition, the search for moderator
variables that could influence the way in which the outgroup is infra-humanized should
be broadened. Even though the socio-structural relationship between the ingroup and the
outgroup did not alter the infra-humanization effect, it remains doubtful that people tend
to infra-humanize all (relevant) outgroups to the same extent.
14 Together with the previous work on infra-humanization, the present study documents
the importance of the human dimension in intergroup relations and shows how deeply
rooted our biased thoughts and behaviors towards the outgroup really are. Even though
mostly  apparent  in  subtle  biases,  people  show a  consistent  tendency  to  reserve  the
human category for their own group and to attribute a lesser degree of humanity to
outgroups. A similar inference can be found in the historical thesis of Jahoda (1999) on
the ancient roots of modern prejudice in Western culture. Based on an abundant amount
of historical examples and testimonies, he connects the ancient “images of savages” to
the endurance of modern prejudice today and concludes:
The images, (…) are of course tokens which stand for clusters of – predominantly
negative  –  beliefs  and  feelings  regarding  outgroups.  The  key  image  in  this
connection, and the one that has survived most stubbornly, is that of  “animality.”
(Jahoda, 1999, p. 243-244)
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RÉSUMÉS
Récemment,  une  nouvelle  ligne  de  recherche  en  psychologie  sociale  a  montré  que  les  gens
tendent à réserver l'essence humaine pour décrire leur propre groupe, percevant des membres
de l’exogroupe comme "infra-humains" (Leyens et al.,  2000, 2003).  L'article actuel résume les
résultats  principaux  de  ce  nouveau  mode  de  penser.  Spécifiquement,  cette  théorie  s'est
concentrée sur les émotions typiquement humaines. Demandés à décrire leur propre groupe et
un exogroupe approprié, les individus ont attribué moins d’émotions typiquement humaines à
l'exogroupe. Étant donné que toutes les caractéristiques typiquement humaines sont nécessaires
mais aucune n’est suffisante pour être considérée comme entièrement humain, Leyens et ses
collègues ont  interprété  cette  attribution différentielle  d'émotions typiquement humaines en
termes d'infra-humanisation. En plus, cet article présente une extension de la théorie de l’infra-
humanisation au domaine des stéréotypes. Une première étude est décrite qui démontre que les
stéréotypes  de  l’endogroupe  sont  plus  humains  que  les  stéréotypes  de  l’exo-groupe.  Pris
ensemble, ces travaux indiquent que les préjugés modernes sont marqués par des différences
entre l'endo-groupe et l'exo-groupe en termes humains.
Recently a new line of research in social psychology demonstrated that people tend to reserve
the  human  essence  to  describe  their  own  group,  perceiving  outgroup  members  as  “infra-
humans” (Leyens et al., 2000, 2003). The present article summarizes the main findings of this new
way of theorizing. Specifically, this theory focused on uniquely human emotions. When asked to
describe their own group and a relevant outgroup,  individuals  ascribed less uniquely human
emotions to the outgroup. Given that all uniquely human characteristics are necessary but none
of  them are  sufficient  to  be  considered fully  human,  Leyens  and colleagues  interpreted this
differential attribution of uniquely human emotions in terms of infra-humanization. In addition,
this article introduces an extension of the infra-humanization theory broadening its premises to
research on stereotypes. A first study is reported that demonstrates that ingroup stereotypes
bear  more  human  meaning  than  outgrouup  stereotypes.  Overall,  this  research  shows  that
prejudice even today is marked by differences between the ingroup and the outgroup in human
terms.
INDEX
Keywords : émotions, infra-humanization, intergroup relations, prejudice, stéréotypes
Mots-clés : infra-humanisation, préjugés, relations intergroupe
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